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CONTRACTS - MumcIPAL CoRPORATIONS - RBvocABILITY oF OFFER StraMITTED UNDER STATUTORY COMPETITIVE BIDDING-In accordance with statutory

provisions,1 the city commissioners of Atlantic City advertised for bids for certain
public improvements. Plaintiff submitted a sealed bid accompanied by a deposit
of $5,000, as required by the advertisement, to guarantee execution of the contract
if it were tlie successful bidder. When tlie bids were opened, plaintiff was
the lowest bidder by a considerable margin. Investigation disclosed that an appreciable error had been made in tlie calculation of its bid, however, and before any
official action had been taken, plaintiff advised tlie city commission of tlie mistake and withdrew tlie bid. Nevertheless, tlie contract was subsequently awarded
to plaintiff, and on its refusal to perform, the $5,000 was declared forfeited. In
a suit in equity for return of the deposit, held plaintiff may recover $5,000. A
competitive bid is in tlie nature of an option to the municipality and may not be
witlidrawn, but equity may grant relief by way of rescission of tlie bid on tlie basis
of mistake. Conduit & Foundation Corp. v. Atlantic City, (N.J. 1949) 64 A.(2d)
382.
When, under a competitive bidding statute/! an offer is made to a municipality
in response to an advertisement for bids,3 tlie question frequently arises whether
the bidder may withdraw his offer before it has been accepted by the formal award
of the contract. At law, the view is almost uniformly taken that such an offer is
irrevocable;4 tliough tlie bidder gives notice of his revocation to the municipality
before any action has been taken, the revocation may be ignored. 5 If the bidder is
awarded the contract he is obliged to perform or forfeit his deposit as liquidated
12 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §40:50-1. For any contract over $1,000 the municipality
must publicly advertise for bids and shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.
(The council may reject all of the bids and readvertise.) There is no express statutory provision that bids shall be irrevocable on submission.
2 These statutes commonly enumerate the type of contract for which competitive bidding
is required and the procedure to be followed, and provide that the contract be awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder. Less frequently, the statute (or city charter) will expressly declare
bids irrevocable. Baltimore v. Robinson Constr. Co., 123 Md. 660, 91 A 682 (1914). The
statutes of at least one state provide.for withdrawal or correction of a bid. Krasin v. Village
of Almond, 233 Wis. 513, 290 N.W. 152 (1940).
3 Customarily, the response to an advertisement for bids is construed as an offer (cf.
rules governing auction sales). Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218, 34 S.Ct. 84 (1913). It
is conceivable that the advertisement could be so worded that a bid would be an acceptance.
1 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §31 (1936).
4 22 R.C.L., Public Works, §13. _Contra, Bromagin & Co. v. Bloomington, 234 ill. 114,
84 N.E. 760 (1908). However, if the municipality umeasonably delays taking action on the
bid, it may be withdrawn and the deposit recovered. Lupfer & Remick v. Freeholders of
Atlantic Co., 87 N.J. Eq. 491, 100 A. 927 (1917). This is also true when the statutory procedure has not been followed by the municipality or the award does not conform to the
advertisement. L.R.A. 1915A, 225. In absence of a competitive bidding statute, a bid may
be withdrawn any time before acceptance. Gray Constr. Co. v. Sioux Falls, 43 S.D. 395, 179
N.W. 497 (1920).
5 In fact, it has been held that the municipality has no right to allow withdrawal of the
bid. 3 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CcRPORATIONs, §1324 (1943). Contra, Moffett, Hodgkins
& Clarke Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 20 S.Ct. 957 (1900).
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damages. 6 It is fundamental in the common law of contracts that a promise embodied in a mere offer is not in itself binding without the presence of contractual
elements, and that an offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. 7 In holding that
the bidder is bound by the mere submission of his offer8 (subject to the possibility
of equitable relief9), courts have not always made clear why they hold inapplicable
the general rule that an offer may be withdrawn before acceptance. Frequently,
the point is assumed without analysis. If the statute under which the contract is
to be let declares that bids submitted thereunder shall be irrevocable, the question
is easily answered. 10 However, this is not the usual case. 11 The mere fact that the
offer was intended to be irrevocable would seem insufficient, in view of the common law requirement of consideration.12 Some courts intimate that irrevocability
of the offer is the price paid for the privilege of submitting the offer; it is a condition imposed on the bidder, which he is powerless to escape. 13 The principal case
is illustrative of those cases14 which have stayed within conventional contract law
by treating the offer as an option to the municipality; the consideration binding the
offeror being the assurance of an award of the contract as against all competitors,
if the bid is the lowest responsible one submitted. 15 More commonly, courts treat
the question simply as one of statutory construction;16 that is, the irrevocability
of a bid once submitted is a necessary incident of the legislative policy behind such
statutes.17 Whatever the legal theory may be, it would seem that a bidder in the
6 The bidder cannot be held liable for damages in excess of his deposit, however. Bowes
Co. v. Milton, 255 Mass. 228, 151 N.E. 116 (1926).
7Paynev. Cave, 3 T.R. 148, IOOEng. Rep. 502 (1789); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev.
ed., §55 (1936). Detrimental reliance on the offer does not prevent revocation before acceptance. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 344.
8 That a bid may not be withdrawn even before the bids are opened, see Baltimore v.
Robinson Constr. Co., 123 Md. 660, 91 A. 682 (1914).
9 Rescission has been granted even where the statute declares the bid irrevocable. See,
e.g., Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, supra, note 5.
10 It is clearly competent for the legislature to so provide. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS,
rev. ed., §31 (1936).
11 See note 2, supra. Cf. note 1, supra.
12 Revocation is possible even though the offeror expressly promises that the offer will
not be withdrawn. Bancroft v. Martin, 144 Miss. 384, 109 S. 859 (1926).
13 Baltimore v. Robinson Constr. Co., 123 Md. 660, 91 A. 682 (1914); United States v.
Conti, (C.C.A. 1st, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 652.
14 Cf. Daddario v. Town of Medfield, 294 Mass. 438, 5 N.E. (2d) 23 (1936).
15 If the municipality is free to accept any of the bids, this theory is not available; but
presumably it would be applicable if, in lieu of accepting the lowest bid, all bids must be
rejected and the proposal readvertised. Obviously, the bidder's submission of the required
deposit does not constitute consideration to bind his own offer.
16 "[I]t is plain that the statute contemplated some obligation on the part of the
bidders, even though there was none on the part of the city," Wheaton Bldg. & Lbr. Co. v.
Boston, 204 Mass. 218 at 222, 90 N.E. 598 (1910).
17 If the purpose of such statutes is protection of the public [City of Hattiesburg v.
Cobb Bros. Constr. Co., 174 Miss. 20, 163 S. 676 (1935)], then it can be said that bids are
irrevocable to prevent collusion or withdrawal in bad faith on discovery that the bid was
lower than competition required. If, however, emphasis is placed on the statute's purpose
to protect the bidder, as other New Jersey cases have held [e.g., Sellitto v. Cedar Grove Tp.,
132 N.J.L. 29, 38 A. (2d) 185 (1944)], it seems inconsistent to say it prevents a bidder in the
position of the plaintiff in the principal case from withdrawing his bid.
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position of the plaintiff in the principal case may not rely on self-help by revocation under the law of contracts, but must seek the intervention of a court of equity.

Richard H. Conn

